

SECURITY INFORMATION

Analysis of Eastern Europe as it pertains to U.S. Psychological Strategy

I. National Objectives

Psychological strategy in Eastern Europe must be compatible with over-all United States foreign policy which has as its primary objective the preservation of U.S. security preferably by means short of war. At the present time the major threat to this security comes from the Soviet Union and its satellites, which can marshal against us not only large manpower and materiel resources but also has an additional weapon--dynamic Communist ideology.

The greatest single obstacle to the attainment of a decisive victory in the cold war in Eastern Europe is the presence of powerful contingents of the Red Army in East Germany, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Until the Red Army can be induced to withdraw or can be neutralized as an instrument of Soviet policy, both in the satellites and in Russia, cold war psychological warfare activities alone cannot achieve enduring liberation of the peoples of the Eastern European satellites or the U.S.S.R.

The immediate aim of United States foreign policy, therefore, is to balance the power of the Soviet Union and its satellites with at least equal power in the U.S. and her allies. To date this has been attempted through a policy of containment. In the future, however, it is believed that a more dynamic cold war program, aggressively and vigorously prosecuted, is required to reach our goals. This dynamic policy should be designed to throw the Russians off balance by various psychological operations throughout the world and to force them to react to measures initiated by this nation and its allies rather than as in the past when the Western World has been reacting to situations created by the Russians.

This new policy is to be aimed at winning the cold war in the sense of establishing a preponderance of western power in the face of dynamic and aggressive activity on the part of the Soviet Union. It should be borne in mind, in view of our immediate objective of preserving the security of the United States short of war, that it could be disastrous to be too precipitate in the cold war. By being too precipitate we mean the accomplishment of local coups within the satellites or the U.S.S.R. which do not greatly weaken the power of the Soviet Union but so seriously threaten its security or so involve its prestige as to leave it no choice but to wage the war we are seeking to avoid. Furthermore, the successful accomplishment of this cold war program is contingent upon the development and maintenance of solidarity and cohesive strength of the western powers. Difficulty experienced to date in the development of a unified effort on the part of the western European countries and the lack of agreement among countries of the western hemisphere in the sphere of international

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objectives are but typical examples of the problems to be faced in developing a concerted program in the west. These problems will be magnified in direct ratio to the success of western efforts in tipping the balance of power from the Soviet bloc. As Western strength increases and the threat of the Soviet orbit is diminished, tendencies to diverge on policy and economic matters will certainly develop among the Western powers. This is particularly true of the weaker partners to the Western Alliance who will, at the earliest opportunity, seek relief from the severe economic strains occasioned by their rearmament contributions.

Although the objectives set forth above deal only with the prosecution of the cold war, we must be ever mindful of the real possibility that hot war may come at any time. U.S. efforts to achieve these objectives, therefore, must be prosecuted in such manner as to enable us successfully to wage hot war if the need arises. Conversely, we must be careful that preoccupation with hot war readiness does not prejudice the basic purposes and strategy of the cold war.

II. Missions and General Tasks

This Division has two major missions in Europe both of which are aimed at developing or maintaining the balance of power between the West and the Soviet bloc. The first mission is the consolidation of anti-Soviet attitudes in non-Soviet areas. The second is to harass and disrupt the satellites and the U.S.S.R. itself with the aim of making them insecure as bases for launching military offensives and to reduce their effectiveness in launching political offensives against the West.

A. Primary Mission of Eastern European Division

Within our capabilities our most important task in the consolidation of anti-Soviet attitudes in non-Soviet areas is the conduct of a psychological campaign supporting the integration of western German resources into the western European defense community. As a supplementary, but less important, element to this program, we must seek to strengthen the western orientation of Austria and Switzerland.

1. West Germany

a. Objectives. The integration of West Germany into the Western European defense system is vital to the successful development of Western military power sufficient to balance and deter the power of the Soviet bloc. At the same time Western Germany, through

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2. Austria

a. Objectives. Austria is less important to U.S. strategy than Germany, yet its preservation in the Western camp is important to protect Germany's southern flank and to prevent the extension of Soviet influence into the heart of Western Europe. The prevailing immediate U.S. objectives for Austria are at least to maintain the present Western political orientation of the country, to minimize the benefits being derived from the country by the Soviet Union, and to avoid provocations that might induce a Soviet partition of the country. The long-range U.S. aim is to achieve the withdrawal of Soviet forces through the conclusion of an Austrian treaty.

b. Obstacles. The principal obstacles to even the maintenance of the status quo in Austria are the economic weaknesses of the country, aggravated by Soviet economic exploitation; Soviet physical control of the eastern population centers and most important economic areas; and the traditional political apathy of the Austrian people, intensified by their desire to avoid partition.

c. Programs and Methods. The U.S. Government should continue to provide economic assistance to Austria and should facilitate the expansion of Western markets for Austrian products. At the same time, U.S. policy should continue to push for the conclusion of a liberal Austrian treaty. ✓


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


3. Switzerland

a. Objectives. Switzerland is the least strategic of our division's areas, being strongly anti-Communist and geographically removed from direct contact with the Soviet bloc. Our principal cold war objective for Switzerland is therefore to minimize the economic benefits that the Soviets can derive from trade and financial dealings with Switzerland. In addition, in preparation for the contingency of general war, we should attempt to induce Switzerland to participate in the bolstering of Western European defenses.

b. Obstacles. The chief obstacle to U.S. objectives is Switzerland's deep-rooted and traditional policy of neutrality, which inhibits overt official partiality toward the West in comparison with the East in economic and military matters.

c. Programs and Methods. Both official U.S. diplomatic policies and covert programs should seek to convince the Swiss people that neutrality in the present world struggle cannot be sustained, and that Swiss national self-interest requires closer cooperation with the West in the cold war. Success in this program would entail greater official Swiss support in curtailing the flow of strategic goods and hard currencies, through Switzerland to the East, as well as Swiss cooperation in Western European political and military programs. Pending the reorientation of official Swiss policy, the



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B. The Second General Mission of the Eastern European Division

The second general mission of the Eastern European Division is to disrupt the mechanism of control of the Communist regime in the satellite states and the U.S.S.R. itself. The general purposes of such a mission are to develop the potentialities of elements of the population behind the curtain sympathetic to the West and to exploit the hostilities of the population to the Communist regime. Activities in support of the general mission, can be directed towards one or more of the following basic objectives:

- (a) To contribute to the achievement of a preponderance of Western power by weakening the Communist apparatus of control;
- (b) To confuse and deceive the Communist administration by developing and exaggerating the extent of unrest and antagonism with which it contends; and,
- (c) Assuming the existence or achievement of a preponderance of Western power, to prepare for the ultimate liberation of particular satellite areas under circumstances such as to minimize the risks of general war.

In support of these objectives the following categories of activity ~~are~~, in the order of priority, available to the Division:

(a) The creation and support of a "political center" of representative emigre Russian groups designed to provide the peoples of Russia with an alternative to the Soviet Government and thus to stimulate the transfer of their allegiance from Communism to a representative political organism located in and controlled by the West. ✓

(b) Support of the aspirations of East Germans for liberation from Soviet controls and reunification with Western Germany.

✓ (c) 1. The development and exploitation of economic and political unrest existing in Czechoslovakia.

2. Support of dissident elements within Poland capable of contributing to the retardation of Russian military forces in the event of a Soviet attack on the West, or of sustained revolutionary effort in the event of a substantial weakening of the Soviet apparatus of control.

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
3. The stimulation of unrest and support of dissident elements in Hungary.

(d) Denial, by covert economic warfare methods, of strategic material necessary to sustain the Soviet and satellite military and economic program.

(e) Exaggerating and fabricating disaffection in some or all of the satellite areas for the purpose of deceiving the Soviet regime concerning U.S. basic objectives, immobilizing Soviet occupation and security forces and, by centering Soviet attention to the Eastern European area, minimizing the Communist threat in other areas such as the Far East.


2. U.S.S.R. and its Peoples.

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2. East Germany

a. Objectives. Western orientation in Eastern Germany is based on strong nationalistic, economic and blood ties to West Germany. The potential distrust of a Christian community (overwhelmingly Protestant) for Communism plus the historic German fear and contempt for the Slavs also contribute to make East Germany naturally incline towards association with the West. Western control

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of a portion of Berlin constitutes a Western salient into East Germany and makes it the most accessible of the satellite countries. At the same time, its natural resources, technical skill, industry and communications facilities make East Germany an especially important element in the Soviet satellite system. In East Germany, therefore, the U.S. has its most challenging opportunity to penetrate harrass and weaken the Soviet power structure.

b. Obstacles. The presence of the Red Army and associated police and political controls in East Germany constitute the most serious deterrent to U.S. objectives. The integration of East Germany into the Soviet economic orbit is a further obstacle. In addition, despite preponderant popular anti-Soviet sentiments, a growing loss of confidence in the Western economic system has been reported. Also, both traditional German subservience to authority and the effectiveness of Communist "unity" and "peace" propaganda, supported by the "neutralist" expressions of certain religious and other German leaders, have discouraged active resistance.

An additional factor complicating the American policy designed to accomplish the liberation of East Germany and its reunification with the West is the fear and distrust with which such developments are observed in France, Poland and elsewhere in Western Europe and the satellites.

c. Proposed Programs and Methods. Immediate U.S. program objectives for East Germany should be to disrupt Soviet Communist aggressive capabilities through fostering psychological resistance, penetrating and disaffecting Communist security and political instrumentalities, and disrupting East German economic activity. Long-range program objectives suggested are to facilitate reunification with Western Germany, either through an agreement with the Soviets to neutralize a united Germany, or through a revolution supported by a calculated limited action by West German military forces, backed up by predominant Western strength. Since true neutralization of a Germany, unified and democratic in the Western sense, would probably redound eventually to the advantage of the West, Soviet agreement to such unification is considered unlikely. A successful West German military action would be contingent upon the attainment of evident Western military superiority.

For the intermediate future, therefore, U.S. programs directed at East Germany should have the limited objective of harassment. Psychological programs designed to foster popular resistance attitudes in East Germany should generally be directed at the same population categories and should employ the same themes as in West Germany, although greater emphasis should be placed on the social values of Western economic systems, and on patience rather than intemperate

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
action. Exploitation of Communist measures of oppression, perversion of justice and fraudulent elections should be exploited for their value in both Eastern and Western Germany.

Psychological programs to stimulate resistance should be accompanied by agent penetration, defection, economic warfare and limited sabotage operations, as well as measures to disaffect Soviet occupation forces and East German police and security organizations.

U.S. diplomatic and overt information programs should reinforce covert programs by evidencing U.S. concern for reuniting Germany and eliminating Soviet oppression.

An increase in the tempo of resistance activity in East Germany would appear to be justified and desirable provided: a) such activities for the immediate future, have the limited goals of agitating against Soviet oppression straining the Soviet apparatus of political and security controls and disrupting the economy and are not extended to anything approaching armed insurrection, and b) responsibility for instituting and maintaining such activities is in no way attributable to the United States. The institution of repressive measures by the Soviets to counter increased unrest and resistance could become a factor favorable to U.S. policy objectives. Properly exploited by propaganda they could have the effect of antagonizing segments of the population now inclined to a policy of neutralism and collaboration, including certain elements of the Protestant church. Blatant and publicized repression could do much to consolidate public opinion in East and West Germany against the Soviets and could even evoke a certain sympathy amongst dissident groups in Poland. Encouragement for such a program, however, would have to be securely hidden and rendered through strictly indigenous groups including, for example, West German political parties with whom OPC is now collaborating.

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3. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary

a. Objectives. As stated previously, the objectives of the OPC cold war plan against the satellites, as well as against the U.S.S.R. itself, are pointed toward weakening the power of the Soviet bloc. Through the instigation of controlled, covert psychological warfare programs within the Soviet bloc, it is anticipated that a spirit of active resistance will be developed among the populations of these countries. Through participation in such cold war programs, it is anticipated that participating elements of these populations will gain experience and the necessary know-how to engage in preparations for more active resistance in the form of sabotage and other paramilitary activities.

b. Obstacles. As in the case of East Germany, the presence of the Red Army and severe Soviet controls are the main obstacles to the achievement of U.S. objectives in these countries. Other obstacles include popular fears of the revival of German military strength (a concept in partial conflict with our primary mission of integrating Western Germany into the European Defense Force), Soviet youth programs whose intensive indoctrination increases Communist strength, the absence of clear-cut policy statements from Western powers regarding Poland and the Czech-Slovak problem, the geographical proximity of these countries to the U.S.S.R., and disunity among Polish exile groups. ✓

c. Programs and Methods. Psychological themes directed at both general and specific targets within these areas must be designed to build up the will of the people to resist Soviet domination. In this connection, however, it must be recognized that two different situations prevail. In Poland, where OPC has sponsored and already developed a strong resistance group, psychological warfare efforts must be carefully planned to fit the requirements of this group. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, on the other hand, the lack of active organized resistance groups presents broader fields for psychological warfare. In these countries general emphasis will be placed upon themes designed to develop resistance attitudes among the general populace.

✓ 2 Defection inducement programs will be directed at Soviet occupation forces and against other selected targets. This is viewed as a program of high priority. In this connection the degree of political and economic unrest in Czechoslovakia is worth noting. This has been evidenced by recent purges in the highest ranks of the government and party hierarchy. Moreover there have been indications of economic disintegration in Czechoslovakia deduced from the inability of the economy to meet its quotas and control disaffection in labor. Against this background the possibilities of defecting prominent Czech Communists appear attractive. The publicity value of such defections could be exploited both in the East and in the West.

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
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Encouragement, within limits short of provocation of war, will be given to limited acts of sabotage and related activities along with preparations for paramilitary action that may be warranted at some future date.

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U. General Mission.- Activities designed to deny strategic materials to the Soviet bloc.

a. Objectives. Although the total volume of goods imported by the Soviet bloc from the outside world amounts to but a small percentage of the aggregate output of the area under Soviet control these imports represent a very important factor in the Soviet military economy. They consist very largely of items essential for military preparedness and for the expansion of the industrial base of the Soviet bloc. For this reason the National Security Council has directed stepped-up efforts to impair the strength of the Soviet world through intensified economic warfare (NSC 104). Covert resources exist or can be created to contribute to any national effort in the economic warfare field. ✓

b. Obstacles. To the extent that economic warfare objectives include the disrupting of industrial production in the Soviet area OPC activities are limited by the security controls and other difficulties of operating behind the curtain referred to in preceding paragraphs of this paper. Nevertheless certain opportunities exist and can be intensified. 25X1C

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general obstacle to the obstruction of industrial output in the satellite areas is the success achieved by the Soviets in integrating the satellite and Russian economies and the severe measures initiated by the satellite political regimes to ensure maintenance of standards and quotas of production. Politicians, management, and labor are thereby personally committed to the success of the economic program.

The flow of trade between the East and West results largely from the fact that Eastern Europe has historically constituted the source of raw material as well as a market for Western manufacturers. Attempts to curtail this trade have been disrupted by the self interest of individual industrialists and the difficulties of enforcing effective controls. No longer an alternative which is completely satisfactory to Eastern sources of supply and markets has yet been made apparent. Although the boom in war materials has provided an immediate market for many products, it has also inflated the cost of raw materials from areas under Western control. Moreover the European businessman has his eye on the future and is likely, ^{UNLESS} strictly controlled, to maintain certain exports to the East if only as insurance against a change


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
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in the political scene.

25X1C A complicating factor in the enforcement of export controls is the fact that not all trade can be prohibited without imposing severe strain on the economies of certain Western countries. Consequently a difficult problem of identifying and distinguishing the legal from the illegal item for export is presented. This has been further complicated by the fact that lack of an alternative source of supply has driven the West to countenance trade agreements in which strategic items on the prohibited list may be exchanged by Western countries for raw materials from the East.



25X1C A final obstacle is the fact that the Soviet bloc apparently has unlimited supplies of various currencies at its disposal which it is prepared to expend for the procurement of strategic items including certain key raw material, machine and precision tools and pharmaceuticals.



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